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Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization
Amos Fiat and Amiram Wingarten
School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University
Abstract. We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller
who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items.
Consistent with standard usage [9] [10], we define an allocation/pricing
to be envy free if no agent wishes to replace her allocation (and pricing)
with those of another agent.
If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then
we show that finding the revenue maximizing envy free allocation/pricing
can be solved in polynomial time by reducing it to an instance of weighted
independent set on a perfect graph.
We also consider a generalization of envy freeness. We define an alloca-
tion/pricing as multi envy free if no agent wishes to replace her alloca-
tion with the union of the allocations of some set of other agents and her
price with the sum of their prices. We show that even though such allo-
cation/pricing can be approximated by O(logm+ log n) factor [3], it is
coNP -hard to decide if a given allocation/pricing is multi envy free. We
also show that revenue maximization multi envy free allocation/pricing
is APX hard.
An interesting restricted version of the subset pricing problem is when
all items are intervals of a line segment and all requests are a contiguous
set of items along the line. The motivation here is that one can think
of the agents as drivers on a highway when each product is highway
segment(or guests in a hotel — items are translated to dates). In this
setting, determining if a given allocation/pricing is multi envy free is
polynomial time. If the highway has bounded capacities then a revenue
maximizing envy free allocation/pricing can be computed in polynomial
time and we also give an FPTAS for the revenue maximizing multi envy
free allocation/pricing.
1 Introduction
We consider the combinatorial auction setting where there are several
different items for sale, not all items are identical, and agents have valu-
ations for subsets of items. We allow the seller to have identical copies of
an item. We distinguish between the case of limited supply (e.g., physical
goods) and that of unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods). Agents have
known valuations for subsets of items. We assume free disposal, i.e., the
valuation of a superset is ≥ the valuation of a subset. Let S be a set of
items, agent i has valuation vi(S) for set S. The valuation functions, vi,
are public knowledge. Ergo, we are not concerned with issues of truth-
fulness or incentive compatible bidding. Our concern here is to maximize
revenue in an envy free manner.
Our goal is to determine prices for sets of items while (approximately)
maximizing revenue. The output of the mechanism is a payment function
p that assigns prices to sets of items and an allocation a. Although there
are exponentially many such sets, we will only consider payments func-
tions that have a concise representation. For a set of items S let p(S) be
the payment required for set S. Let ai be the set assigned to agent i.
In general, every agent i has valuation function vi defined over every
subset of items.
Given a payment function p, and a set of valuation functions vi, let
zi = maxS(vi(S) − p(S)), and let Si to be a collection of sets such that
S ∈ Si if and only if vi(S)− p(S) = zi.
We now distinguish between two notions of envy freeness.
Definition 1 We say that (a, p) are envy free if
– If zi > 0 then ai ∈ Si.
– If zi = 0 then either ai ∈ Si or ai = ∅.
– If zi < 0 then ai = ∅.
Definition 2 If ai = ∅ then we say that agent i loses, otherwise we say
that agent i wins.
Definition 3 A pricing p is monotone if for each subset S and for each
collection of subsets C such that S ⊆ ⋃T∈C T the following inequality
holds: p(S) ≤∑T∈C p(T ).
Definition 4 An allocation/pricing (a, p) is multi envy free if it is envy
free and its pricing is monotone.
Clearly, multi envy-freeness is a more demanding requirement than
envy-freeness, so any allocation/pricing that is multi envy-free is also
envy-free. In item pricing, a price is set for every item, identical copies
of an item are priced the same, and the price of a set is the sum of the
individual item prices. In subset pricing one may assign a sets of items
prices that cannot be consistently expressed as a sum of the item prices
comprising the set. E.g., discounts for volume would not generally be
consistent with item pricing.
In the unlimited supply setting, item pricing is always multi envy-
free (and hence also envy-free). With a limited supply of items, achieving
item-pricing [multi] envy-freeness is not automatic. Circumstances may
arise where some agent has a valuation less than the price of some set of
items she is interested in, but there is insufficient supply of these items.
An envy-free solution must avoid such scenarios. Even so, for limited or
unlimited supply, item pricing is envy-free if and only if item pricing is
multi envy-free (this follows from the monotonicity of the item pricing).
For subset pricing, it does not necessarily follow that every alloca-
tion/pricing that is envy-free is also multi envy-free.
Although the definitions above are valid in general, we are interested
in single minded bidders, and more specifically in a special case of sin-
gle minded bidders called the highway problem ([13,2]) where items are
ordered and agents bid for consecutive interval of items.
2 Our Results
Table 1 gives gaps in revenue between the item pricing (where envy free-
ness and multi envy freeness are equivalent), multi envy freeness, and
envy freeness. These gaps are for single minded bidders, and the gaps be-
tween item pricing and multi envy free subset pricing are in the context
of the highway problem. In all cases (single minded bidders or not)
Revenue([Multi] EF item pricing) ≤ Revenue(Multi EF subset pricing)
≤ Revenue(EF subset pricing)
≤ Social Welfare.
Clearly, if a lower bound holds for unlimited supply it clearly also holds
for (big enough) limited supply.
All of our lower bound constructions are for single minded bidders,
for single minded bidders with unlimited supply the bounds are almost
tight as
(Social welfare)/(Envy-free item pricing) ≤ Hm +Hn.
This follows directly from [13], see below.
For limited supply, lower bound # 1 shows for some inputs the revenue
of [Multi] Envy-free item pricing can be significantly smaller (by a factor
≤ Hn/n or ≤ Hm/m) than the revenue of Multi envy-free subset pricing.
This gap is smaller for unlimited supply, lower bound # 3 shows that for
unlimited supply it is possible to achieve a ratio of 1/Hn or 1/ log logm
between the revenue of [Multi] Envy-free item pricing and that of Multi
Lower [Multi] Envy-free Multi envy-free Envy-free Type of
Bound item pricing subset pricing subset pricing Instance
Limited #1 Hn n Highway
Hm m
Unlimited #2 1 Hn Single Minded
1 Hm
Unlimited #3 1 Hn Highway
1 log logm
Table 1. Revenue gaps for single minded bidders (n - # items, m - #
agents).
envy free subset pricing. Both lower bounds # 1 and # 3 are for the
highway problem.
Lower bound # 2 in Table 1 shows a gap in revenue (1/Hn or 1/Hm)
between Multi envy-free subset pricing and Envy-free subset pricing. This
bound is for single minded bidders, but not for the highway problem.
We further give several hardness results and several positive algorith-
mic results:
1. For unlimited supply, and single minded bidders, we show that finding
the envy free allocation/pricing that maximizes revenue is polynomial
time.
2. We show that the decision problem of whether an allocation/pricing
is multi envy free is coNP -hard.
3. We also show that finding an allocation/pricing that is multi envy free
and maximizes the revenue is APX -hard.
4. For the the highway problem, we show a that if all capacities are O(1)
then the (exact) revenue maximizing envy free allocation/pricing can
be computed in polynomial time. I.e., the problem is fixed parameter
tractable with respect to the capacity.
5. Again, for the highway problem with O(1) capacities, we give a FP-
TAS for revenue maximization under the more difficult Multi envy-free
requirements.
3 Related Work
Much of the work on envy free revenue maximization is on item pricing
rather than on subset pricing. Guruswami et al. [13] give an O(logm +
log n)-approximation for the general single minded problem, where n is
the number of items and m is the number of agents. This result was
extended by Balcan et al. [3] to an O(logm + log n)-approximation for
arbitrary valuations and unlimited supply using single fixed pricing which
is basically pricing all bundles with the same price. Demaine et al. [8]
show that the general item pricing problem with unlimited availability of
items is hard to approximate within a (semi-)logarithmic factor.
The general combinatorial auction setting allows agents to request any
arbitrary set of items. Even for unlimited supply, the problem of max-
imizing the revenue is hard to approximate within a (semi-)logarithmic
factor [8] (and shown to be APX hard for a restricted case called the
“graph vertex problem” where agents are interested in sets of one or two
items only [13]).
If every agent has an associated set of items such that the agent val-
ues any nonempty subset equally, [13] present a O(log n) approximation
algorithm. Briest and Krysta [5] show that the revenue maximization
problem is inapproximable within O(logǫm) for some ǫ > 0. This indi-
cates that we can not expect to do better in the more general setting
where valuations are for bundles and agents are not single minded.
For the limited supply general problem it is easy to show that it is NP-
hard to approximate it within m or n1/2 as noted by Cheung and Swamy
in [7] (Grigoriev et al. [11] show that it is NP-complete to approximate
the maximum profit within a factor m1−ǫ , for any ǫ > 0 even when the
underlying graph is a grid). [7] gives an O(
√
n log umax) approximation for
envy free profit maximization problem (where umax = max item supply).
The Highway Problem
For the unlimited supply the problem is NP-hard (Briest and Kriesta
[4]). Also the problem is given O(log n)-approximation by [2]. When
the length of each interval is bounded by a constant or the valuation
of each agent is bounded by a constant, Guruswami et al. [13] give a
fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS). If the intervals
requested by different agents have a nested structure then an FPTAS is
possible [2,4].
For limited supply when the number of available copies per item is
bounded by C, Grigoriev et al. [11] propose a dynamic programming al-
gorithm that computes the optimal solution in time O(n2CB2Cm), where
n is the number of agents, m the number of items, and B an upper bound
on the valuations. For C constant, and by appropriately discretizing B,
this algorithm can be used to derive an FPTAS for this version of the
highway problem. However, the solution produced by this algorithm need
not be envy-free. For the highway problem with uniform capacities, [7]
gives an O(log umax) approximation algorithm where all capacities are
equal, this algorithm does produce an envy-free allocation/pricing.
4 Notation and Definitions
In our setting we have m agents and n items.
The capacity of an item is the number of (identical) copies of the item
available for sale. The supply can be unlimited supply or limited supply.
In a limited supply seller is allowed to sell up to some fixed amount of
copies of each item. In the unlimited supply setting, there is no limit as
to how many units of an item can be sold.
We consider single-minded bidders, where each agent has a valuation
for a bundle of items, Si, and has valuation 0 for all sets S that are not
supersets of Si. The valuation function for i, vi, has a succinct repre-
sentation as (Si, vi) where vi = vi(Si). For every S such that Si ⊆ S,
vi(S) = vi(Si) = vi, for all other sets S
′, vi(S
′) = 0.
If ai = S and Si ⊂ S, we can change the allocation to be ai = Si
and keep the same price. The original allocation/pricing is envy free if
and only if the modified allocation is also envy free. Therefore, we can
say without lost of generality, that an allocation/pricing must either have
ai = ∅ and pi(ai) = 0 or ai = Si and pi(ai) ≤ vi(Si).
We denote the set of agents i allocated Si (the winning agents) W =
{i : ai 6= ∅} to be the set of agents for which ai = Si. Our goal is to find
an allocation/pricing that maximizes
∑
i∈W
p(Si).
For single minded bidders, we say that agent i wins if i ∈W . Otherwise,
we say that i loses.
Fix the price function p. For unlimited supply,it is easy to see that
the revenue maximizing winner set W = {i : p(Si) ≤ v(Si)}. For limited
supply, it must be that
{i : p(Si) < v(Si)} ⊆W ⊆ {i : p(Si) ≤ v(Si)}.
4.1 Envy and Multi Envy for Single minded bidders
For single minded bidders, the definitions of envy free and multi envy free
can be simplified as follows:
Observation 5 For single minded bidders an allocation/pricing is envy
free if and only if
1. For any two winning agents i and j, if Si ⊆ Sj, it holds that p(Si) ≤
p(Sj)
2. For each losing agent i and winning agent j such that Si ⊆ Sj it holds
that v(Si) ≤ p(Sj)
Observation 6 For single minded bidders an allocation/pricing is multi
envy free if and only if
1. For any winning agent i and any collection of winning agents C such
that Si ⊆
⋃
j∈C Sj the following must hold: p(Si) ≤
∑
j∈C p(Sj)
2. For any losing agent i and any collection of winning agents C such
that Si ⊆
⋃
j∈C Sj the following must hold: v(Si) ≤
∑
j∈C p(Sj).
5 Revenue Gaps Between Models
In this section we show the gaps between the optimal solutions of the
different models. It is clear that item pricing envy free setting is less
profitable than the subset pricing multi envy free setting since any item
pricing solution is also multi envy free solution. We give two theorems that
show the gaps between the two models when items are given in limited
supply and when items are given in unlimited supply.
The following theorem corresponds to line #1 in Table 1.
Theorem 7 The maximal revenue in an envy-free item pricing for the
limited supply highway setting may be as low as Hkk times the maximal
revenue achievable by a subset pricing that is multi envy free(where Hk is
the k’th Harmonic number, and k is the maximal capacity of an item).
Proof. Consider a path of k segments where segment 1 has capacity of k
and for i > 1, segment i has capacity n− i+ 1. There are two groups of
agents in the setting:
– k agents: { request [1, i] with valuation of 1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ k}
– k − 1 agents: { request [i, i] with valuation of 1i | 1 ≤ i ≤ k
}
See Figure 1 for illustration.
Clearly the best an item pricing envy-free solution can achieve is Hk
by assigning price of 1i to segment i. A subset pricing multi envy free
solution can price all intervals on the path at 1 and get a revenue of k.
The number of requests is O(k), therefore the gap is O(m/Hm).
We now deal with the gaps between item pricing setting, multi envy
free setting and envy free setting when items are given in unlimited sup-
ply. It is clear that any item pricing solution is also multi envy free
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Fig. 1. The most profitable agents are the the one with valuation 1, how-
ever allocating them with their bundles makes the others envy
solution and that any multi envy free solution is also an envy free so-
lution. The question is how big can the gap be, how more can a seller
profit by choosing another concept of envy? Guruswami et al. [13] give
an O(logm+ log n)-approximation for the general item pricing problem.
The upper bound used is the sum of all valuations. Since any item pricing
solution is also multi envy free and since the sum of all valuations can
be used as an upper bound on multi envy free and envy free solutions,
we conclude that the gap between any pair of these problems is upper
bounded by O(logm + log n). We show lower bounds on the gaps. The
following theorem corresponds to line #3 in Table 1.
Theorem 8 Multi envy free subset pricing setting for the unlimited sup-
ply problem (even for a highway) can improve the optimal item pricing
solution by a factor of O(log logm) where m is the number of requests.
Proof. We construct the following agent requests along a path. We assume
for simplicity that n, the number of items, is a power of 2, so n = 2k.
We have k + 1 layers of requests, starting from layer 0 up to layer k. In
layer i there are 2i equal sized requests, each for 2k−i items, of valuation
1
2i(k−i)
. See Figure 2. The multi envy-free pricing can accept all requests
and achieve revenue O(Hk) while item pricing can produce at most O(1)
revenue. Since k = O(logm) this shows that the ratio between [multi]
envy-free item pricing revenue and multi envy free subset pricing revenue
can be as low as O(1/ log logm).
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The following theorem corresponds to line #2 in Table 1.
Theorem 9 Envy free subset pricing setting for the unlimited supply
problem can improve on the optimal multi envy free allocation/pricing
solution by a factor of O(logm) where m is the number of requests.
Proof. We construct an instance with m agents and m items. The set of
all items is denoted V = {1, ...,m}. For agent i we have Si = V \ {i}
with valuation vi =
1
i . Since every request is a subset of the union of any
two other requests, the minimal vi+ vj where vi and vj both, is an upper
bound on the revenue that can be achieved from any allocated request
in the multi envy free setting. Let the two lowest winning valuations
be iα and iβ . All requests with lower valuations are not allocated. All
requests with valuation higher than iα and iβ can have price that is at
most 1iα +
1
iβ
. Therefore no multi envy free allocation/pricing can achieve
more than revenue 2.
On the other hand, in the envy free setting, an allocation of each
request at price pi = vi is valid and achieves revenue of Hm. Therefore,
the ratio between maximal revenue achieved in the multi envy free setting
vs. the maximal revenue achieved in the envy free setting can be as low
as O(1/ logm).
6 Polynomial time envy-free revenue maximization
(unlimited supply, single minded bidders)
We discuss in this section the classical envy free approach where each
agent may envy only one other agent (not a group of other agents). There-
fore we seek an allocation/pricing such that Observation 4.1 is valid.
With limited supply of items, a reduction from independent set can
be used to show that the problem of maximizing revenue is hard to ap-
proximate within m1−ǫ. Grigoriev et al. [11] show that it is NP-complete
to approximate the maximum profit limited supply item pricing solution
to within a factor m1−ǫ , for any ǫ > 0 even when the underlying graph
is a grid. The same construction can be used here.
For the unlimited supply setting we show that:
Theorem 10 For single minded bidders the revenue maximizing envy
free allocation/pricing with unlimited supply can be computed in polyno-
mial time.
Our idea is to make use of the fact that allocating a certain request at price
p means that any request that is a superset and has valuation < p must
not be allocated. We transform all requests into a directed acyclic perfect
graph H and then compute the revenue maximizing allocation/pricing
by computing a maximal independent set on H (which can be done in
polynomial time for perfect graph). A similar construction using the hi-
erarchical nature of a pricing was done by Chen et al. [6] for envy free
pricing of products over a graph with metric substitutability.
As before, agent i seeks bundle Si and has valuation vi.
6.1 Construction of Graph H
For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, define
A(i) = {1 ≤ j ≤ m|Si ⊆ Sj and vj < vi}.
The reason we consider only requests with lower valuations is that when
picking i’s price only these allocations are at risk. Given price p for agent
i, all requests in A(i) with valuation < p cannot be allocated at any price.
For each agent i , define an ordering πi on A(i) in non-decreasing
order of valuation. I.e., for each pair j, k such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ ni,
where ni = |A(i)|, the valuations must be ordered, vπi(j) ≤ vπi(k) (ties are
broken arbitrarily).
We construct an undirected vertex-weighted graph H as follows. For
each i ∈ V we associate ni + 1 weighted vertices in H. These vertices
constitute the T (i) component, the vertices of which are {i1, i2, ..., ini+1}.
The set of all H vertices is defined as
⋃
i∈V Ti. The weight of each vertex
in T (i) is:
w(i1) = vπi(1)
w(i2) = vπi(2) − vπi(1)
...
w(in) = vπi(ni) − vπi(ni−1)
w(ini+1) = vi − vπi(ni)
By definition of A(i) and πi, all weights are non-negative and
∑
j∈T (i)
w(j) = vi.
For each T (i) component we connect the various vertices of T (i) to com-
ponents T (j) such that j ∈ A(i) (connecting a vertex ik ∈ T (i) to a
component T (j) means connecting ik to all vertices of T (j) by edges) as
follows. Vertex ini+1 is connected to all components T (j) for j ∈ A(i).
Vertex ik is connected to all components T (πi(j)) for each j such that
1 ≤ j < k. For instance, vertex i2 is connected to component T (πi(1)),
vertex i3 is connected to components T (πi(1)) and T (πi(2)), and so on.
As i is not contained in A(i) there can’t be self edges. It is easy to see
that for any a < b, ib is connected to each component that ia is connected
to (and maybe to some additional components).
See Figure 3 for the exact construction of edges from a component
t(i). Figure 4 shows an example of transforming a pricing problem into
the graph H.
Lemma 11 The value of the maximum weighted independent set on H
is equal to the revenue obtained from the optimal envy free pricing of the
original problem.
Proof. When picking vertices for the maximal independent set instance,
in every component T (i) one must choose vertices whose sum equals the
valuation of agent j, where j ∈ A(i) or j = i. A component that none of
its vertices were picked means that agent i was not allocated her set. The
construction of H ensures that the pricing is envy-free. We prove that
a maximal revenue envy-free allcation/pricing can be translated into an
independent set in H and that a maximal independent set in H can be
translated into a revenue maximizing envy free allocation/pricing.
(envyfree ⇒ IS) We show how to construct an independent set so-
lution in H from the optimal allocation/pricing of the original pricing
instance. It is easy to see that the price pi is equal to one of the val-
uations vj for j such that j ∈ A(i) or j = i (otherwise the prices can
be increased). We will pick vertices in T (i) to achieve price of pi. Let us
assume that pi = vj for some j such that j ∈ A(i) ∪ {i}. We will pick all
vertices of ik ∈ T (i) such that k ≤ π(j). By construction of T (i) our pick
gives an accumulated value of vj = pi. As we have a valid pricing we can
assume that ∀i, j : Si ⊂ Sj ⇒ pi ≤ pj. Let us assume by contradiction
that our pick is not a valid independent set. It follows that there are two
vertices ik and jm such that j ∈ A(i) and there is an edge between them.
Since edges are drawn from ik to all components that represent requests
that have lower valuation than
∑
1≤t<k w(it) we get that pj must be less
than pi (pi ≥
∑
1≤t<k w(it)). This contradicts our assumption.
(IS ⇒ envyfree) Assuming we have an optimal independent set so-
lution in H. By H construction, in each component T (i) any node ik is
connected to all neighbors of im for m < k. Therefore the vertices set
that are picked as part of the independent set in each component T (i)
is of the form {ik|k ≤ imax}. We transform the independent set solution
into a pricing as follows:
– Agent i such that none of T (i)’s vertices were picked receives nothing.
– Agent i such that the vertices {ik|k ≤ imax} were picked in T (i)
receives Si at price
∑
k≤imax w(ik)
T (i)
T (pii(3)) T (pii(ni))T (pii(1)) T (pii(ni−1))
i1 i2 i3 i4 ini ini+1
T (pii(2))
Fig. 3. Construction of H
Assume that the pricing is not envy-free and we have requests i, j such
that Si ⊂ Sj and pi > pj . By the construction of H we can assume that pi
and pj are equal to vi′ and vj′ such that i
′ ∈ A(i) and j′ ∈ A(j). We picked
from T (i) vertices {ik : 1 ≤ k ≤ imax} such that
∑
1≤k≤imax w(ik) = vi′ .
The same goes for T (j).
Let’s inspect the vertices in T (j) that should have been picked in order
to make pj ≥ pi.
Define J as the minimal set of vertices in T (j) of the form {jk|jmax <
k ≤ t} such that∑1≤k≤tw(jk) ≥ pi. The vertices of J has outgoing edges
(from i to A(i)) into components T (k) such that k ∈ A(i) (requests that
are superset of j and i and have lower valuation than i).
The vertices reachable from J by the outgoing edges are reachable
also by iimax . Hence we are guaranteed that they are not picked. Also we
know that all vertices that have edges into J were not picked as picking
one of them would have prevented picking any of T (j)’s vertices.
Therefore there is no reason for the independent set not to pick also
the vertices of J and increase the independent set value. This contradicts
the maximality of the independent set solution.
Lemma 12 H is a comparability graph
Proof. Let us direct the edges of H. In case of edge from node of T (i) to
node of T (j) the direction will be from i to j if j ∈ A(i).
This orientation assignment results a directed graph with transitivity:
if we have directed edge from iα to jβ and from jβ to kγ , we show that
there must be directed edge from iα to kγ .
Note that since k ∈ A(j) and j ∈ A(i) then k ∈ A(i) as A(j) ⊂ A(i).
The fact that there is directed edge from jβ to T (k) means that vj > vk,
therefore in πi order it will also be higher (And to the right in Figure 3).
Since iα is connected to all components T (πi(l)) such that 1 ≤ l < α
and iα is also connected to T (j), iα must be connected to T (k) as well (as
π−1i (k) < π
−1
i (j)). Clearly iα is connected to each node of T (k) including
kγ .
We’ve shown that the edges of the graph can be oriented so that the
transitivity property is maintained. Therefore the graph is a comparabil-
ity graph.
A graph is said to be perfect if the chromatic number (the least number
of colors needed to color the graph) of every induced subgraph equals the
clique number of that subgraph. Showing that H is a comparability graph
implies the following corollary:
Corollary 13 H is a perfect graph.
We know that the maximal weighted independent set can be solved
in polynomial time on perfect graphs [12]. By Lemma 11 and Lemma 12
we conclude that finding the optimal envy free allocation/pricing in the
most general single minded setting can be done in polynomial time. This
completes the proof of Theorem 10.
7 Hardness of multi envy-free allocation/pricing
In this section we show the following hardness results:
– The problem of deciding whether a certain pricing assignment is multi
envy free is coNP -hard.
– Maximizing revenue from single minded agents subject to multi envy
free pricing is APX -hard.
Theorem 14 The problem of deciding whether a certain pricing assign-
ment is multi envy free is coNP-hard.
Proof. We show a polynomial reduction from VERTEX-COVER(k) to
our decision problem. Assume that there is an algorithm A that con-
firm the envy-freeness of a given subset pricing. The NP-hard problem
of VERTEX-COVER(k) can be reduced to this problem. The building of
subset pricing from VERTEX-COVER(k) instance is as follows:
– Each edge turns into an item.
– Each vertex turns into a set with price 1.
– Give the price k − 1 to the set of all items.
(Note that this is a limited supply setting where each item is chosen
by 3 subsets at most.)
Clearly A confirms that this instance is not legal if and only if there
is a vertex cover to the VERTEX-COVER instance of size k.
Since VERTEX-COVER is NP-hard this imply that The problem of
deciding weather a certain pricing is envy-free is coNP-hard.
Note that even though deciding whether a pricing is multi envy free
is hard, finding such a pricing can be approximated. Balcan et al. [3]
showed O(logm + log n)-approximation for arbitrary bundle valuations
and unlimited supply using single fixed pricing which is basically pricing
all bundles at the same price. Such a pricing is multi envy free pricing as
well.
Theorem 15 Maximizing revenue from single minded agents subject to
multi envy free pricing is APX-hard, even when all agents are interested
in at most two items.
Proof. We show that finding the optimal multi envy free pricing is APX-
hard by a reduction from MAX-2SAT. Given a MAX-2SAT instance we
build multi envy free allocation instance as follows.
Let’s denote C as the number of clauses in the SAT and C(v) the
number of clauses containing variable v.
Items in the allocation problems are:
– For each literal we have an item to sell. Thus for each variable there
are two items, one for the variable and one for its negation.
Agents in the allocation are:
– For each literal of variable v we have two sets of 10C(v) agents each.
For one set all valuations are 3 and for the other all valuations are 2.
– For each variable v we have set of 15C(v) agents that wish to buy the
variable’s item and its negation’s with valuation 5.
– For each disjunction clause there is a single agent that wishes to buy
both literals of the clause with valuation 5.
We show that there is a pricing with revenue at least 314C + k if and
only if there is a solution to the 2SAT instance that satisfies at least k
clauses.
Let us prove the easy direction. Assume that there is a solution to the
MAX-2SAT problem that satisfy at least k clauses. Assign a price of 3
to each request for a literal that is set to true in the solution. Assign a
price of 2 to each request for literals that are set to false in the solution.
Assign a price of 5 for each clause request. Each variable request is priced
at 5. This gives a valid multi envy free pricing and we can verify that the
revenue of it is 314C + k.
For the other direction, let p be a pricing with maximum revenue, and
assume the the revenue is at least 314C + k. The optimal way to price
variable and literal agents for variable v is be pricing one literal at 2 and
the other at 3, in that way the variable requests for both literals is priced
at 5 and the revenue from the variable and literals agents is 155C(v). By
the optimality of p, since variable and literals agents are always more
profitable than the clause agents, all variables must be priced in this
manner. Each clause can be priced at 4 if both its literals are priced at 2,
or by 5 if one (at least) of its literals is priced at 3. In total this means that
from pricing allocation of revenue 314C + k defines a natural assignment
to the MAX-2SAT problem by making literals priced at 3 to be true.
Because the maximum 2-SAT solution satisfy at least 14 of the clauses,
we are seek for a case where k ≥ c4 . Some straightforward calculations
shows that a 1256+η1257 approximation of the multi envy free pricing/allocation
problem would yield an η-approximation to the MAX-2-SAT. This proves
that multi envy free pricing/allocation problem is NP-hard to approxi-
mate to within 1256+η1257 , where η = .943 is the approximation hardness
constant for MAX-2SAT problem shown in [14].
8 The Highway Problem
The highway problem is the vertex problem pricing in the special case
where the vertices are numbered 1, ..., n and each agent is interested in
an interval [i, j].
8.1 Multi Envy Free Hardness Results
Theorem 16 Multi envy free allocation/pricing for the highway problem
is in NP.
Proof. We give a polynomial time algorithm that verifies that a given
pricing and allocation is envy free. The algorithm builds a directed graph
over the same nodes of the highway, where for each segment I there is an
edge for any allocated request i that contains I, with weight vi. Then the
algorithm computes the shortest path for any allocated request’s segment
in order to find irregularities. See Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Verifying a given allocation/pricing on the highway to be
multi envy free
1. Create directed graph G where for each allocated bundle of price p there are
directed edges between the first node and all other nodes in the bundle with weight
p ( see Figure 5)
2. For each allocated bundle of price q and for each unallocated bundle with valuation
q do:
– Compute the shortest path in G between the first and last nodes of the bundle
– If q is higher than the shortest path, return false (the allocation/pricing is not
multi envy free)
3. return true
Every path of weight w can be translated into a set of allocated bun-
dles of total price w and vice versa. Therefore is there is no path shorter
than q there is no set of requests that has total total price lower than q
and the agent is not envious. In the other direction it is easy to see that if
the algorithm finds a path which is shorter than q then this path can be
translated into a set of agents that get the bundle at a lower price than
q.
Theorem 17 The problem of finding the revenue maximizing multi envy
free solution for the highway problem is NP-hard.
Proof. We show a polynomial time reduction from PARTITION, similar
to the reduction of item pricing highway problem shown in [4]. The input
to the partition instance is a multiset of weights I = {wi}. For weight
wi we construct a weight component on the highway Wi which consist of
three agents interested in item i:
– Request at price wi
– Another request at price wi
– Request at price 2wi
In addition another two agents are interested in purchasing all the items.
Both of them with valuation 32
∑
wi. See Figure 6.
The weight obtained from component Wi can be 2wi, or 3wi. 3wi is
achieved by pricing the item at wi and accepting all agents with price wi
each. 2wi is achieved by pricing the item at 2wi and accepting only the
third agent. In order to profit from the full valuations of the two agents
interested in all items we need that the total price of all items be no more
than 32
∑
wi.
It can be argued that the maximum revenue is earned when there is
a partition between components, when some of them earn 3wi and some
2wi and the two agents interested in all items pay their full valuations.
There is a pricing that reach revenue of 92 if and only if there is a partition
of I into S and I \ S such that the sum of weights in both is equal.
8.2 O(1) Edge Capacities, Multi Envy Free Highway
Allocation/Pricing
In the problem on a path with limited edge capacities, each edge e ∈ E
can accommodate no more than ce allocated requests. Let C = max ce.
Somewhat inspired by what’s done in [11] we show that we can solve this
problem in time O(m2CB2C
2
n) by finding a longest path in an acyclic
digraph.
Here is a useful definition of winner multi envy free allocation/pricing
and a lemma that shows how to transform winner multi envy free alloca-
tion/pricing to multi envy free allocation/pricing.
Definition 18 An allocation/pricing is winner multi envy free if for any
winning agent i, its set Si is not a subset of a union of other sets (of
winning agents) for which the sum of the prices is strictly less than the
price of the set Si.
Lemma 19 Assume we have a winner multi envy free allocation/pricing
for a subset pricing instance over a highway with revenue R. A multi envy
free allocation/pricing can be computed in time O(m2) with revenue ≥ R.
Proof. Given an allocation/pricing that is winner multi envy free, one
can convert it into an allocation/pricing that achieves at least the same
revenue and is multi envy free.
For each agent i such that ai = ∅ compute the cheapest (by pricing)
collection B of winning agents such that Si ⊂ ∪j∈Paj. This can be done
by using shortest path algorithm on winning agents prices in the same way
as Algorithm 1. If vi(Si) ≥
∑
j∈B p(aj) then agent i obeys the condition
required for unallocated agents in multi envy free allocations.
If vi(Si) <
∑
j∈B p(aj), then we perform the following steps:
– Compute the cheapest (by valuation) collection C of winning agents
such that Si ⊂ ∪j∈Caj (this can be done by the same way as before).
– For each agent j in C, if p(j) < vj , set p(j) = vj and change the
prices of any allocated agent k such that Sj
⋂
Sk 6= ∅ from p(ak) to
the accumulated payment amount of the minimal weight (by payment)
collection of agents that is superset of Sk. C contains the agents that
are part of the cheapest set of agents among their path, therefore none
of the agent prices can exceed their valuation.
– If vi(Si) <
∑
j∈C p(aj) then we assign agent i the set Si, set pi(Si) =∑
j∈C p(aj), and set aj = ∅ for j ∈ C. Since each agent j in C was
allocated with p(aj) = vj, making aj = ∅ does not make j envious.
By doing each replacement we clearly still have a winner multi envy
free solution. In addition, for each j ∈ C there is no cheaper set of agents
for Sj (otherwise these agents would have composed C instead of j),
Therefore none of the agents in C is envious after the switch.
After m iterations the solution is multi envy free.
Theorem 20 For a highway with n elements and m agents with max-
imal valuation B where the capacities of the edges are ≤ C, there is a
O(m2CB2C
2
n) time algorithm for the profit maximization multi envy free
problem on a path.
Proof. We create an n-layered digraph D with an additional source s and
sink t, layers 0 and n+1, respectively. There are arcs only between layers
that represents neighboring items on the highway. Hence, in any s → t
path, there are exactly n+ 2 nodes.
In each node in layer e, corresponding to item e, we store all winning
agents j that are accommodated by edge e. We store the total amounts all
these agents spend on all items (network links) in their path. Moreover,
we store for each pair < i, j > the value of the shortest possible path
between first edge of i to current edge that accommodates j. Basically
these values can be thought of as matrix (A)i,j of size ≤ C2 that holds in
each cell the shortest paths between first edge of i to current edge that
accommodates j, then the diagonal (i, i) represents the amount spent by
i itself.
Any node x (more precisely, the path s→ x) in the digraph represents
a feasible partial solution. Arcs from node x of layer e to node y of layer
e+1 are only introduced if the path s→ y represents a feasible extension
of the partial solution represented by the path s → x. The weight on an
arc that connects a node of layer e to a node of layer e + 1 is equal to
the profit earned on edge e + 1, that is, the total amount that the new
introduced allocated agents of edge e+ 1 pay.
Therefore, the weight of the longest s→ t path in digraph D is equal
to the maximum total profit. Moreover, the set of winning agents can be
reconstructed from the longest s→ t path. Algorithm 2 shows a more for-
mal description. The allocated agents in this allocation do not envy each
other, however they can be envied by the losers (the allocation/pricing
is winner multi envy free). Lemma 19 shows how to overcome this issue
and produce multi envy free allocation/pricing.
Lemma 21 There is a O(m2CB2C
2
n) time algorithm that produces opti-
mal winner multi envy free allocation/pricing for the profit maximization
problem on the highway.
Proof. Recall that C is an upper bound on the edge capacities. Consider
path P from s to t in D. The winner set is the union of all winning agents
of nodes of P. By the construction of D its nodes on level e can’t accom-
modate more than ce and agent i can’t get item e that does not belong to
Si. By condition 1 of the arcs definition an agent can be allocated with
her entire bundle or with an empty bundle. By definition of the nodes set
(condition 1) all allocations with higher price than agent’s valuation are
removed. By condition 2 of the node set no agent can envy other agents
in P.
We showed that P is giving a legal allocation/pricing that is winner
multi envy free. Since the total weight of P gives the revenue (each winning
agent price is summed once, when it first appears) we get that the heaviest
path P yields an optimal solution.
The size of D is Each edge in the original graph translated to layer
of nodes in D. For a layer there are at most mC possible subsets of size
≤ max{ce, |Je|} which is multiplied by the size of
⋃
k U
e
k which is bounded
by BC
2
. Therefore there are at most mCBC
2
nodes in a layer. Each node
in a layer has at most nCBC
2
edges to nodes in the next layer, this gives
total of m2CB2C
2
arcs between two consecutive layers. This means that
there are at most m2CB2C
2
n arcs in D. The computation time to find the
longest path in D is linear in the number of arcs, since D is acyclic [1].
We continue with the proof of Theorem 20. By Lemma 21 we can
build a winner multi envy free optimal solution to the problem in time
O(m2CB2C
2
n). Then if we use simple algorithm (similar to Algorithm
1) that computes the smallest valuation collection of winners for each
envious losing agent, from Lemma 19 we get an O(m2CB2C
2
n) algorithm
as required.
8.3 FPTAS for Highway Revenue, O(1) Edge Capacities,
Multi Envy Freeness
We next show how to turn the dynamic programming algorithm into a
fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS); that is, for any
ǫ > 0, we have an algorithm that computes a solution with profit at least
(1 − ǫ) times the optimum profit, in time polynomial in the input and
1
ǫ . To that end, we just apply the dynamic programming algorithm on a
rounded instance in which the agents’ valuations are b′j = ⌊bj/K⌋ where
K := (ǫB/m(n+ 1)) for ǫ > 0.
We show an FPTAS for the problem of finding an optimal winner
multi envy free solution. By Lemma 19 we also get an FPTAS for the
multi envy free problem as well.
Let us denote by (W,p) an allocation of winners (W ) and prices for
bundles (p). Let
∏
(W,p) denote the revenue of the instance (W,p).
Lemma 22 For any winner multi envy free solution of the original (W,p)
instance, there is a winner multi envy free solution (W,p′) of the rounded
instance so that
∏
(W,p) > 1K
∏
(W,p′)−mn−m
Proof. Let (W,p) be a feasible solution to the original instance with profit∏
(W,p). At first for each bundle we set its price in the rounded instance
as p′i = ⌊pi/K⌋. Now we have a pricing that might be illegal, hence our
second phase is to set each illegally priced bundle i (when agent i is envy)
to be with price
∑
p′j of the cheapest collection of bundles that cover Si.
During the first phase each bundle price is reduced by at most 1.
During the second phase each bundle price is reduced by at most n
(number of items) as the size of the cheapest collection of bundles that
cover Si is bounded by n. The solution (W,p
′) is feasible to the rounded
instance and:
∏
(W,p′) =
∑
j∈W
p′j >
∑
j∈W
(
pj
K
− n− 1) ≥ 1
K
∏
(W,p)−mn−m
Lemma 23 For any winner multi envy free solution of the rounded (W ′, p′)
instance, there is a winner multi envy free solution (W ′, p˜) of the original
instance so that
∏
(W ′, p˜) = K
∏
(W ′, p′).
Proof. By multiplying the prices of the rounded instance by K we get
prices that are still lower than the valuations (of the original instance),
therefore this gives a valid solution for the original instance as required.
Now we combine the two lemmas to produce an FPTAS.
Theorem 24 There exists an FPTAS for revenue maximization winner
multi envy free highway problem with constant edge capacities.
Proof. Let (W,p) be the optimal solution for the original instance. By
rounding the valuations b′j = ⌊bj/K⌋ we can compute optimal solution
to the rounded instance (W ′, p′). By the process described in Lemma
23 we construct solution (W ′, p˜). By two previous lemmas this solution
approximation to the optimal solution is
∏
(W ′, p˜) = K
∏
(W ′, p′)
> K(
1
K
∏
(W,p′)−mn−m)
=
∏
(W,p′)− ǫBm(n+ 1)
m(n+ 1)
Ergo,
∏
(W ′, p˜) ≥ (1− ǫ)∏(W,p).
Since Lemma 19 shows a polynomial algorithm that transform a win-
ner multi envy free solution in the highway to a multi envy free solution,
we get the following corollary:
Theorem 25 There exist an FPTAS for the revenue maximization multi
envy free highway problem with constant edge capacities.
8.4 O(1) Edge Capacities on Envy Free Subset Pricing on
Highway
The problem can be solved in polynomial time by building an acyclic
graph similar to the one in previous section but simpler. The number of
possible prices is equal to the number of valuations (rather than B for
multi envy free problem) as each price equals to some request valuation.
In each level there are nodes for each valid subset of allocated agents
accommodated by the segment and valid pricing assignment for these
agents. The restriction on the graph is that two requests sharing a segment
must not envy each other. By finding longest path on the polynomial size
DAG the problem can be solved in polynomial time.
To summarize:
Theorem 26 There exist polynomial time algorithm for the revenue max-
imization envy free highway problem with constant edge capacities.
??.
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Fig. 4. Step by step example of turning pricing problem into the graphH.
In the bundle requests, each agent would like to buy a set of products (the
black balls) as long as its price is less than her valuation (the numbers in
the bundle requests are valuations). A can be seen as a dependency graph
where there is a vertical edge from each request i up to the requests of
A(i) (note there is no edge between 2 and 7 since 2 ≤ 7). At the last step
the dependency graph is translated into the graph H as defined.
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Fig. 5. Translating pricing assignment into graph G and finding path that
covers the interval [A,B] on a price lower than q. If such path exists, the
request for interval [A,B] is envious.
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Fig. 6. Construction of multi envy free revenue maximization problem
from PARTITION
Algorithm 2 Finding winner multi envy free pricing given an instance
of the limited edge capacities highway problem
– (construction of digraph D) For each edge e ∈ E, we introduce a layer of nodes:
Denote by Je the set of agents j with e ∈ Sj . Let U
e
k holds all possible (sorted
arbitrarily) subsets of Je of size k ≤ max{ce, |J
e|}. Define H = {0, 1, ..., B} where
B is the maximal valuation over all agents. Let Hk be the set of all square matrices
over H of size ≤ k. A pair (U,H) ∈ Uek ×Hk represents having all agents in U as
the only winning agents of e. The price agent i ∈ U pays for Si is hii and the value
of the shortest possible path that pass through j ∈ U , start at the first arc of Si
and ends at e is hij . The set of all nodes in D is
S
e∈E
S
k≤max{ce,|Je|}
Uek × Hk
after we remove:
1. Illegal pricing nodes that have hii > vi
2. Nodes that correspond to the last item of Si for some agent i and ∃j ∈ J
e :
hii > hij (this means that i is envy of a group of agents including j that paid
less for i’s bundle.
Draw an arc from node (U,H) ∈ Uek × Hk to (U
′,H ′) ∈ Ue+1
k′
× Hk′ for layers
2, ..., n if the following conditions hold: (As U and U ′ are sorted, for simplicity, we
denote a request as j ∈ U and j′ ∈ U ′. When saying that j′ 6∈ U ′ the meaning is
that all elements of U ′ does not relate to the same agent as j ∈ U .)
1. If agent j ∈ U and e+ 1 ∈ Sj then j appears also in U
′. If e ∈ Sj and j 6∈ U
then j′ 6∈ U ′
2. For agent j ∈ U that also appears as j′ ∈ U ′ the pricing is consistent, formally:
hjj = h
′
j′j′
3. For pair of agents i, j ∈ U that both appear also in U ′ as i′, j′ respectively,
the shortest path from beginning of i through j stays consistent, formally:
hij = h
′
i′j′
4. For agent j′ ∈ U ′ \U (meaning its correspondent j does not appear in U) and
for each i′ ∈ U ′, h′i′j′ should be equal to h
′
j′j′ +mind hid (if i 6∈ U then the min
expression is set to zero) - this gives the shortest path computation through
each added agent to the allocation
We connect node s to all nodes in layer 1 and we connect all nodes in layer n+ 1
to t. For each arch that goes from node (U,H) ∈ Uek × Hk into node (U
′,H ′) ∈
Ue+1
k′
×Hk′ we give weight of
P
j′∈U′\U h
′
j′j′ .
– Compute the longest s→ t path P in digraph D. The winner set is the set of agents
that appear in U component of some node of P . The pricing of certain agent that
appear as j ∈ U of some node of P is hjj of the same node.
